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Digital Dilemma: Could the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Have Inadvertently Exempted Napster
And Its Progeny From Liability?
Until recently, copyright protection of sound recordings by the
Recording Industry Association of America' (the "RIAA") has been
a fairly easy task. Prior to the advent of digital technology, copyright
holders had little to fear from the mass "pirating" of musical
recordings because the quality of music recorded on "analog" tapes
degrades with each successive copy. In contrast, when digital copies
are made, the copy and each of its successors retains the exact same
quality as the original regardless of how many generations of copies
are made.' Even so, the threat of mass pirating was minimal because
of the enormous size of the files and painfully slow modem speeds.
Prior to the development of compression algorithms and high-speed
Internet connections, a five minute song could take several hours to
download.4
Recently, however, computer programmers have developed
compression algorithms which allow data occupying a large amount
of space to be significantly "compressed into files that are easily
transferred across the Internet and downloaded onto a personal
computer."5 The preferred compression format is known as "lossy."6
Basically, the lossy format eliminates those sounds in the original
material which are imperceptible to the human ear, allowing for a
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1. The RIAA represents ninety percent of the music industry and is
responsible for the licencing and sale of music. See Recording Industry
Association of America, About Us, at http://www.riaa.com/About-Who.cfn (last
visited Oct. 24, 2001).
2. If an original tape is copied onto another tape and copies are made from
each successive tape, the quality of each new copy will have a sound quality which
is inferior to the copy from which it was made. See, Benton J. Gaffney, Copyright
Statutes That Regulate Technology: A Comparative Analysis of the Audio Home
Recording Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 611
(2000).
3. This is because a digital copy is simply a sequence of ones and zeros which
are encoded on to a disk, be it metal (hard drive) or plastic (compact disk), unlike
analog recordings which are transferred through the use of a magnetic tape. Id. at
616. It is also important to note that you may not get around this problem by
copying a compact disc onto a tape and then making a copy of the tape because the
second generation copy still uses analog technology.
4. See Wendy M. Pollack, Tuningln: The Future of Copyright Protection For
Online Music in the Digital Millennium, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2445, 2450 (2000).
5. Id. at 2449 (citing Brenda Sandburg, The Online Freeway Jam (last visited
July 25, 1999), at http://www.ipmag.com/monthly/99-june/sandburg.html).
6. J.D. Tygar, Expert Report 11, available athttp://dl.napster.com/tygar.pdf
(last visited Oct. 24, 2001).
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huge reduction in storage requirements.7 The most popular, and most
feared, lossy format is the MPEG-I Audio Layer 3, or MP3.8 Files
compressed into the MP3 format, when combined with a high speed
modem, reduce the amount of time it takes to download a song from
hours to merely minutes.
Two years ago, a nineteen-year old college student turned the
music industry upside down when he created the revolutionary new
file sharing program known as Napster. The system, run by Napster,
Inc. (Napster), enabled users to swap songs configured in the MP3
format on an unprecedented scale. Limited by only the need of a
computer with Internet access, Napster made large scale music piracy
as easy as using a telephone. In addition, Napster defined the future
of music distribution on an international level by eliminating the need
for fancy packaging, shipping, and retail stores, the cost of which is
passed on to consumers. Perhaps best of all, online music
distribution allows consumers to choose individual songs instead of
forcing them to buy an entire album at an exorbitant price in order to
obtain a desired song. Unfortunately for the RIAA, the Napster
system not only allowed users to bypass the traditional distribution
chain, but also paid nothing to the copyright owners of songs
downloaded by its users.
As Napster's user base began to grow exponentially, record
company executives realized the new kid at the table was not
bluffing. Being no stranger to the game, the RIAA decided to ask the
courts for a new hand, and in December of 1999 filed suit in the
Northern District of California against Napster, Inc. for contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement.9 In its defense, Napster
claimed its activity does not rise to the level of contributory or
vicarious infringement. In the alternative, Napster claimed that it was
exempt from liability because it qualified for the "safe harbor" for
information location tools contained in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).' °
Naturally, the publicity surrounding the case piqued the curiosity
of Internet users world wide and Napster's membership increased
7. Id. at 12. This is different from "lossless" compression which reduces
storage space by combining common patterns in the source material. When the
material is "reopened" on the user's hard drive, it re-expands to the full size of the
original material. Id. at 11.
8. See Michael Behar, It's Playback Time! And MP3 is Only the Beginning,
Wired, Aug. 1999, at 122.
9. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff'd in part and revd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th 2001).
10. Id. at 901.
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astronomically." Worried that the increased numbers of Napster
users could cause irreparable damage by the time the suit actually
went to trial, the RIAA requested a hearing for preliminary injunction
to enjoin the Napster service from operating until trial. On July 26,
only one day after the hearing, Judge Patel of the Northern District of
California granted the injunction to the plaintiffs. 12 This seemed to
sound the death knell for Napster. However, two days later the Ninth
Circuit stayed the injunction because it felt that Judge Patel, in her
haste, had failed to adequately consider the relevant legal issues."1
While most of the plaintiffs saw this merely as a minor setback,
Bertelsmann Music Group (BMG) felt it was a harbinger as to how
the Ninth Circuit might ultimately rule on appeal after a trial on the
merits. BMG reasoned that a loss would subject them to a slow and
inevitable death while a win would merely be a temporary solution to
a permanent problem. In an impressive and unanticipated move,
BMG decided to take advantage of Napster's technology and
established user-base by dropping out of the suit and forming an
alliance with Napster. In return, Napster agreed to work with BMG
to transform Napster into a fee-based music distribution system.
After considering the issue for six months, on February 12, 2001
the Ninth Circuit finally ruled on the preliminary injunction which it
had previously stayed.'" In its decision, the court affirmed the
granting of a modified version of the preliminary injunction in favor
of the plaintiffs. The court felt that the injunction was warranted but
that the original order by Judge Patel was overbroad." Importantly,
in issuing its opinion the Ninth Circuit refused to discuss the merits
of whether Napster may be able to take advantage of the liability
exemptions contained in the DMCA. 6
More recently, on September 24, 2001 Napster settled with
songwriters and publishers for $26 million and agreed to make
royalty payments once it started a fee-based distribution system.
Napster has not reached a settlement with the record companies.
11. Napster's membership increased from 200,000 to 40,000,000 in a matter
of months. See Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 4, A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18688 (N.D. Cal. July 28,
2000) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees].
12. See Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896. Note there is a discrepancy
between the date the injunction was ordered and the date the case was actually
reported because Judge Patel felt it was necessary that the injunction begin
immediately.
13. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. 00-16401,00-16403,2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18688 (9th Cir. Jul. 28, 2000).
14. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
15. Id. at 1027.
16. Id. at 1025.
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Although the upholding of the injunction and Napster's settlement
with the songwriters and publishers are clearly victories for the
plaintiffs and their colleagues, they in no way negatively affect the
positions taken in this paper. Also, it is important to note that while
this paper focuses on whether Napster itself could take advantage of
the liability exemptions contained in the DMCA, it is meant to have
much broader implications. That is, the analysis contained herein is
applicable not only to Napster, but also to any music sharing system
which employs the Napster-type technology.
Section I of this paper will give an overview of the Napster
technology. Section II will provide an explanation of the traditional
theories of copyright infringement in the United States. Section III
will set out the requirements which are necessary for a service
provider to take advantage of the liability exemption for information
location tools contained in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Section IV will discuss the liability of Napster under traditional
theories of copyright infringement. Section V will examine Napster
under the DMCA and make the argument that Napster's coverage
under the DMCA is a highly likely possibility. Section VI will
present the argument that, although not intended by Congress, a court
deciding the issue should follow the wording of the DMCA and leave
it up to Congress to close the loophole in the exemptions. This
section will also detail some of the problems Congress might face in
fashioning a remedy to this situation and suggest some possible
solutions. Section VII will offer a brief conclusion.
I. NAPSTER, INC.
Napster, Inc. maintains a website and central server which
operates a "virtual community."' 7 It is a free service that allows
music listeners to "share" their favorite music in MP3 format with
millions of other Internet users. To date, Napster receives no revenue
from its users, advertising, or any other source.'8 To get started, users
may download Napster's MusicShare software free of charge. After
supplying a user name and choosing a password, users can use the
software to access the Napster computer network." When a user is
logged on, the MusicShare software reads the names of all the MP3
files stored in the Napster folder on his computer. Then, these names
are added to a directory on the Napster server which contains a list of
17. Napster at http://www.napster.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2001).
18. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,901 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
19. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6243 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000).
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all other MP3 files contained in the hard drives of all other users
which are logged on at the same time.2" To locate a song, the user
enters the title of the specific song or name of the artist and clicks the
"Find It" button on the program." The Napster program searches its
compiled directory of all logged on users and creates a list of the
available files. The user then clicks on the file he wishes to
download. The program communicates with the host user, i.e. the
user whose computer contains the desired file, and connects the two
computers.22 If the file is available, it is then transferred from the
host users hard drive to that of the requesting user via the Internet. It
is important to note that, although the transfer would not be possible
without the Napster software, the file itself is transferred across the
Internet through point-to-point communication between Napster users
and is not routed through the Napster server.23
To say that Napster users "share" MP3 files is somewhat of an
understatement. In the traditional sense, when we think of sharing
music, we think of copying tapes from our friends. Because the size
of our friend pool is necessarily limited, the amount of copying that
can take place is small compared to the number of people in the
country. However, the copying potential of the Napster technology
is limited only by the requirement of a computer with Internet access.
When the RIAA filed its action against Napster in December of 1999,
it had approximately 200,000 users.24 This number grew to 75
million by the year's end.2 5 Prior to the injunction issued by the
Ninth Circuit, at any given time there were between 900,000 and
1,500,000 files listed in the database and able to be downloaded. At
its height, approximately 10,000 music files per second were
transferred using Napster.26 Although the studies conducted by
experts for the opposing sides differ, it is undisputed that a significant
portion, possibly as much as eighty-seven percent, of the files found
on the Napster system are copyrighted." Of that eighty-seven
percent, it is estimated that the plaintiffs own as much as seventy
percent of the copyrights.28 Considering that neither the record
companies nor the artists receive a penny for any of this activity, it is
no wonder they are worried. From the point of view of copyright
20. Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *3-6.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees, supra note 11, at 4.
25. Id.
26. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. C 99-5183 MHP and C 00-
0074 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20668, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
27. Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20668, at *3.
28. Id.
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holders, every time someone uses Napster to download music for
free, they are stealing their paycheck.
II. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A. Brief History of Copyright Law in America
The founders of our nation found copyright protection so
essential to the success of the nation that they provided for it in the
Constitution.29 Article I, Section 8, clause 8 gives Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the Exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The goal sought
to be achieved by providing authors and other artists with a limited
monopoly over their works is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good."'3 By ensuring that artists will be compensated
for their efforts, copyright law generates an incentive to create works
from which the public will ultimately benefit.
In this country, musical compositions have been protected by
copyright since 183 1.31 Sound recordings, i.e., the reproduction of
sounds as opposed to musical notation, have been protected by
copyright since 1972.32 Currently, Title 17 of the United States Code
governs all copyright law. Unauthorized use of copyrighted works
constitutes an infringement entitling the owner of the copyright to
monetary or injunctive relief.3 3 Three basic theories of copyright
infringement exist: direct infringement, contributory infringement,
and vicarious liability.34
B. Direct Infringement
The statutory framework of copyright law is set out in Title 17 of
the United States Code (the "Copyright Act").35 Section 106 of Title
17 gives copyright holders the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute,
perform publicly, display, and prepare derivative works of
29. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. See Benton J. Gaffney, Copyright Statutes That Regulate Technology: A
Comparative Analysis of the Audio Home Recording Act and The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 611 (2000) (quoting Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 95 S. Ct. 2040, 2044 (1975)).
31. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
32. Id.
33. See Pollack, supra note 4.
34. Id.
35. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101-1332 (West 1996).
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copyrighted material.36 Direct infringement occurs when a party
exercises one of these exclusive rights without permission from the
copyright owner." To prevail on a direct infringement claim, the
copyright owner must prove (1) ownership of a valid copyright and
(2) that a copy of the protected work has been made "beyond the
scope of [the] license."3" Under the Copyright Act, intent or
knowledge is not an element of direct infringement.39 Thus, the direct
infringer is liable "whether the person violating the rights did so
intentionally or by accident." '4
In MAI Systems Co. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 1 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that downloading material onto a computer's
Random Access Memory, or RAM, by an individual user constitutes
the creation of a copy under the Copyright Act. If a user was not
authorized by a copyright owner to make a copy of the downloaded12
material, his actions constitute a direct infringement. Although this
ruling was a major victory for copyright owners, its practical
application is limited. In MAISystems direct evidence existed of the
user copying protected material; however, this kind of evidence is
extremely hard to obtain in the cyberworld because the responsible
parties are often impossible to locate.43 Furthermore, direct infringers
on the Internet rarely have deep enough pockets to compensate
36. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 2001) provides, in pertinent part:
Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(3) to distribute copies ... to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of..., musical, ... works .... to perform the copyrighted
work publicly;
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
37. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 1996).
38. See MAI Systems Corp. v Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th
Cir. 1993).
39. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501.
40. See Mark Radcliff, Digital Millennium Copyright Act Forging the
Copyright Framework for the Internet: First Steps, 557 PLI/Pat 365, 370 (1999).
41. 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993). See also, Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) ("the act of loading a program
from a medium of storage into a computer's memory creates a copy of the
program").
42. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501.
43. See Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Seeking Shelter From the MP3 Storm: How
Far Does the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability
Limitation Reach?, 7 Comm. L. Conspectus 423 (1999).
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copyright owners for the damage they may cause; their motivation for
the infringement is often not for monetary gain but an expression of
the widely held belief that everything on the Internet ought to be
free." Thus, third-party liability theories are a much more viable
alternative in the Internet context.
C. Contributory Infringement
The Copyright Act does not expressly provide for third-party
liability of copyright infringement committed by another.4" The
theory of contributory copyright liability "originates in tort law and
stems from the notion that one who directly contributes to another's
infringement should be held accountable." ' Thus, it has long been
accepted that "[t]he absence of such express language ... does not
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on
certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing
activity. 4 7 To prevail on a contributory infringement (or vicarious
liability) claim, a plaintiff must first prove direct infringement by a
third party.48 Once shown, contributory liability will be found where
"one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another." '49
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc. the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the standard
of knowledge is objective: "to have had knowledge, or reason to
know" of the infringing activities.50 That is, would a reasonable
person under similar circumstances have concluded that the
infringing activity was occurring? Although a minority of circuits
employ a more rigorous standard of "actual" knowledge, the Ninth
Circuit has repeatedly chosen to follow the "constructive" knowledge
standard set out in Gershwin.5 1
44. See John Gibeaut, Facing The Music, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 37.
45. See Sony Co. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
434, 104 S. Ct. 774, 785 (1984). In contrast, the Patent Act expressly provides for
liability of certain individuals labeled "contributory" infringers. See 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 271(c) (West 2000).
46. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
47. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435, 104 S. Ct. at 785.
48. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. C 99-5183 MHP and C 00-
0074 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20668, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (citing
Sony, 464 U.S. at 434, 104 S. Ct. at 785).
49. Gershwin Publ'n Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
50. Id. at 1162 (citing Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark Fi Records,
Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
51. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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In addition to meeting the requisite level of knowledge, it must
be shown that the defendant "cause[d], induce~d], or materially
contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of another. 5 2 Although it has
been said that the participation must be "substantial," such a
statement is misleading.53 In Fonovisa, Inc v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,5
the copyright owners of musical recordings sued the operators of a
swap meet where independent vendors sold counterfeit recordings.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that substantial does not
mean that a defendant must "go so far as expressly promot[ing] or
encourag[ing] the sale of counterfeit products" to satisfy the standard
of participation.55 It stated that simply "providing the site and
facilities for known infringing activity" is sufficient to meet the
standard.56 Thus, the judicial interpretation of the "substantial"
participation standard has been quite expansive, and courts are more
likely to side with the copyright owner on this issue in most
situations.57
D. Vicarious Liability
The concept of vicarious copyright liability was developed as an
extension of the agency principles of respondeat superior.58 This
theory traditionally concerns only the liability of an employer for the
acts of his employee. However, in the context of copyright
infringement the test has a broader reach so that "even in the absence
of an employer-employee relationship one may be vicariously liable
if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and
also has a direct financial interest in such activities."59 Thus, to
succeed on a claim of vicarious liability a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant (1) had the right and ability to control the infringer's
actions, and (2) derived a direct financial benefit from the infringing
activity.' It is important to distinguish the difference between
52. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
53. See Rebecca Morris, When is a CD Factory Not Like a Dance Hall?: The
Difficulty of Establishing Third-Party Liability for Infringing Digital Music
Samples, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 257, 296 (2000).
54. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
55. See Morris, supra note 53, at 297 (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264).
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-62.
59. Gershwin Publ'n Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H.L. Green Co., 316
F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)).
60. See Paul D. Amrozowicz, When Law, Science and Technology Worlds
Collide: Copyright Issues on the Internet, 81 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 81,
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vicarious liability and contributory infringement. Vicarious liability
turns upon the relationship between the direct infringer and the
defendant, as opposed to the contributory copyright infringement
theory which focuses on the defendant's knowledge of the infringing
activity.6'
The first determination to be made in the context of traditional
vicarious copyright infringement is whether the defendant had the
"right and ability" to control the infringing activity. Generally,
liability will be found where a defendant has the "legal" or
"potential" power to control the activity.62 The "legal" control
standard will be met if the defendant is merely "in a position to police
the infringement."63 In discussing the vicarious liability of the swap
meet operators in Fonovisa, the court noted that the operators
provided booth space, parking, conducted advertising, and reserved
the right to exclude any vendor for any reason at any time.6 In light
of these circumstances, the court held that the defendant's "ability to
police its vendors under [its] . . . broad contract with its
vendors-was sufficient to satisfy the control requirement" of the
vicarious liability test.65
The second element of traditional vicarious copyright
infringement is that the defendant derive a direct financial benefit
from the infringing activity. In Fonovisa, the profits made by the
swap meet operators were not necessarily directly related to the sale
of infringing material because the vendors all paid a set fee for booth
94 (1999).
61. Id at 94.
62. See Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious
Liability for Copyright Infringement Into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 1005, 1016 (2000). However, a very small percentage of
courts adhere to the actual control standard which requires a "continuing
connection between the two [parties] in regard to the infringing activity" before the
liability can be found. Id. at 1013.
63. Id. at 1016 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163).
64. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996).
65. Id at 263. See also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.Green Co., 316 F.2d
304 (2d Cir. 1963) (licensing agreement with department store requiring
concessionaires to "abide by, observe and obey all regulations" and which gave the
department store "unreviewable discretion" to discharge concessionaires employees
was enough to satisfy the control requirement); Gershwin Publ'n Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) (although defendant
did not have contractual ability to control direct infringers, they were vicariously
liable because they were in a position to police the infringers); Polygram Int'l
Publ'n, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc. 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994) (control
requirement satisfied because defendant could police infringers and promoted show
in which the infringers participated).
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space.66 Because many vendors did not engage in selling infringing
material, it was impossible to tell if the profits of the operator were
attributable to the sale of infringing or noninfringing material.67 The
court, however, stated that the proper test for determining direct
financial benefit is whether the presence of sales of infringing
material is a "draw" for customers,68 i.e., whether it makes the
operation more attractive to customers and, in turn, more beneficial
to the operators. 69
Courts have also found that the financial benefit element may still
be satisfied even if the defendant receives no financial gain from his
operation. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hobi, Inc.,7" the defendant
owned a bar which played copyrighted music via a disc jockey
without paying a fee to the copyright owners.7 The bar never turned
a profit and the owner never received any money from its operation
as a bar. In finding the defendant vicariously liable, the court stated
that defendant satisfied the financial interest requirement of the test
because the "bar ...[was] operated with the goal of making a
profit."72 Thus, at least in some circuits, to satisfy the financial
benefit element a defendant need not actually receive a financial gain
but must merely try to profit from his operation.
III. THE DMCA
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)73 was passed in
1998 as a compromise between copyright owners and online industry71
representatives. Passed with the intent of codifying a
technologically-sound set of guidelines for liability in the realm of
digital communications over the Internet,75 it has generated a
tremendous amount of discussion during the short time it has been in
66. 76 F.3d at 263.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See Morris, supra note 53, at 293. See also Major Bob Music v. Stubbs,
851 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (bar owner received direct financial benefit from
infringing songs played by musician even though the performance was free because
performer induced customers to patronize the bar).
70. Nos. 92-228-B, 92-657-B, 1993 WL 404152 (M.D. La. June 24, 1993).
71. Broadcast Music, 1993 WL 404152, at "1-2.
72. Broadcast Music, 1993 WL 404152, *3.
73. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. NQ. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
74. See David Balaban, Music in the Digital Millennium: The Effects of the
Digital Millennium CopyrightAct ofl998, 7 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 311, 312 (2000).
75. See Jennifer Markiewicz, Seeking Shelter From the MP3 Storm: How Far
Does the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability
Limitation Reach?, 7 Comm L. Conspectus 423, 433 (1999).
NOTES2002]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
existence. The DMCA is a document as complex as the technology
which it addresses; it consists of five titles and covers everything from
liability of online service providers, v6 to protection ofcopyrights for boat
hull designs." Of these five titles, this paper only address' certain
provisions in Title II dealing with limitations of infringement for online
service providers.
Title II of the DMCA, now codified in Section 512 of Title 17,
limits copyright infringement liability for service providers on the
Internet. These "safe harbors" were created by Congress in order to
promote online commerce by limiting the risk of liability for certain
online conduct.78 They ensure "that the efficiency of the Internet will
continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the
Internet will expand."79 The safe harbors limit copyright liability for
online service providers when they are engaged in (1) transitory
communications, (2) system caching, (3) storage of information on
systems at the direction of users, and (4) information location tools.8 0
Only the exemption for information location tools is pertinent to the
discussion in this paper.8' A defendant who, under traditional copyright
liability theories, would otherwise be guilty but qualifies for one of the
safe harbor provisions cannot be liable for monetary relief for copyright
infringement,8 v and the scope of injunctive reliefwhich may be awarded
by ajudge is severely limited.813 However, in order to qualify for the safe
harbors, several requirements must be met. The first inquiry is
determining whether a defendant can be considered a "service provider."
76. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2000).
77. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1301(2) (West 2000).
78. See Linda Pickering & Mauricio F. Paez, Music on the Internet: How to
Minimize Liability Risks While Benefitting From the Use of Music on the Internet,
55 Bus. Law. 409, 425 (1999).
79. Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12A.04(1999) [hereinafter Nimmer].
80. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a)-(d). It should be noted that Section 512(1)
specifically provides that a failure to qualify for one of these safe harbors has no
affect on any other existing defenses the defendant may have. 17U.S.C.A. §512(1).
81. The safe harbors for transitory digital network communications, catching,
and user storage could not, under any stretch of the imagination, be applied to the
technology at issue. Since no material is actually routed through the technology
discussed here, the exception for such conduct cannot apply. The concept of
system catching is especially hard to understand. Its inclusion in the discussion
would create no benefit to the reader and simply cause confusion. Nor is the user
storage exception applicable because (1) no infringing material is stored on these
systems and (2) anything that is stored is not at the direction of the user but takes
place automatically.
82. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512.
83. 17 U.S.C.A. § 5120).
[Vol. 62
A. Who are Service Providers Under the DMCA?
The safe harbor provisions of the DMCA are only available to
those who qualify as "service providers." Title II provides two
definitions for service providers in what is now Section 512(k) of the
Copyright Act. The Act defines "service providers" for the information
location tools exception as those who provide "online services or
network access, or the operator of facilities therefor,", and includes
any "entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications, between or among
points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without
modification to the content of the material." 5
Like much of the legislation passed in an effort to deal with new
technology which is not fully understood, the definitions of "service
providers" are quite ambiguous, and courts have yet to interpret the
definition. Furthermore, when one considers what makes up the
Internet and how it works, the ambiguity grows.
The Internet consists of an incalculable set of interconnected
networks, all of which rely to some extent on one another.8 6 The
Internet, at its most basic level, is analogous to a traditional telephone
service. When a call is made from Louisiana to California, the caller
is not linked directly to the receiving phone by one long, uninterrupted
line. Rather, the call is routed through the local phone service provider,
then directed to a regional long distance provider who then routes the
call to the local provider in California, and then the local provider
directs it to the intended receiver. This process is imperceptible to the
caller, giving the impression of a direct connection. The Internet works
in much the same way, only there are tens of thousands networks
which each perform a separate service and are linked together to form
a seemingly uniform process.8 7 So, do all entities who play a part in
this process qualify as "service providers?" There can be no doubt that
they are providing an "online service." Or, will such an expansive
definition effectively exclude all liability in the online context and,
thus, render the DMCA meaningless?
Regardless of how the courts ultimately interpret the term "service
provider," it is important that they recognize the dangers of a view that
is either too restrictive or too broad. A narrow interpretation would be
underinclusive. Not only could it subject certain services to liability
and actually hinder online commerce, but such a view would also not
be able to adapt to new, unknown technology. Without the ability to
84. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(B).
85. 17 U.S.C.A § 512(k)(1)(A).
86. See Balaban, supra note 74, at 316.
87. Id.
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adapt to change, Congress would have to pass new legislation to deal
with new problems. This is troublesome because often when
Congress places restrictions on access to certain information, they
inadvertently reduce the public's access to information which it is
legally entitled to use, thus, raising First Amendment issues. On the
other hand, if the interpretation is overinclusive, the safe harbor
provisions would effectively swallow the DMCA and strip copyright
owners of their rights in the online context.
B. Additional Requirements
If a defendant qualifies as a service provider as it is defined in
Section 512(k), he still cannot take advantage of any of the safe
harbor provisions until three additional requirements are fulfilled.
First, the service provider must adopt and implement a policy of
terminating the accounts of users who are "repeat infringers.""8
Second, the service provider must inform its users of the existence of
this policy. 9 Lastly, the provider must accommodate and not
interfere with "standard technical measures"90 which are "used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works."'" Once
these requirements are met, the service provider can look to see if its
conduct is one of the types covered in the "safe harbor" provisions.
C. The Relevant "Safe Harbor" Provision
1. Information Location Tools
Section 512(d) exempts from copyright infringement liability
service providers who "by reason of the provider referring or linking
users to an online location containing infringing material or
infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a
directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link. 9 2  The
following conditions must be met in order for this exemption to
apply: (1) the provider does not have actual knowledge of the
infringing activity nor awareness of facts from which infringing
activity is apparent; (2) upon receiving such knowledge removes or
disables access to the infringing material (the "notice and takedown
requirement"); and (3) in cases where the provider has the right and
ability to control the activity it does not receive a direct financial
88. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(A).
89. Id.
90. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(B).
91. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(2).
92. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d).
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benefit from the infringing activity.93
IV. NAPSTER'S LIABILITY UNDER TRADITIONAL THEORIES
A. Direct Infringement
The plaintiffs in the case did not make a claim for direct
infringement against Napster because doing so would have been an
exercise in futility. Although the downloading of a copyrighted song
by Napster's users without permission is undoubtedly a direct
infiingement,94 it is Napster's users and not the company who engaged
in this activity. Furthermore, because the actual infringing activity is
done through point-to-point communication, the illegal material never
even passes through Napster's system. However, the direct
infringements of Napster's users will be relevant to its potential
secondary liability.
B. Contributory Infringement
As a threshold matter, Napster's users must be engaged in direct
copyright infringement before a determination of secondary liability
canbe made.95 Napster's users engage in direct copyright infringement
when they download a song without permission from the copyright
owner.
96
The next question is whether Napster possessed the requisite
knowledge of the infringing activity of its users under the Gershwin97
"constructive" knowledge standard. The evidence shows that well over
half of the files downloaded by Napster users are copyrighted, Napster
never obtained a license permitting users to copy any of these works,98
and Napster knew enough about intellectual property law to sue a rock
band that copied its logo." Considering the enormous number of
infringing files contained in the Napster directory and their
considerable knowledge of copyright law, it would be absurd to suggest
that Napster did not at least have constructive knowledge of the
93. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(d)(2).
94. See MAI Sys. Corp. v Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir.
1993).
95. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
96. See MAI Systems Corp., 991 F.2d at 517.
97. Gershwin Pub'l Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
98. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
99. Ironic, isn't it? Napster sued to enjoin the band The Offspring from using
its logo. See id. at 919.
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infringing activities of its users. Such an idea would require that
Napster employees had never used their own system. Furthermore,
internal documents ofNapster executives stating that Napster users "are
exchanging in pirated music" and that Napster is "not just making
pirated music available but also pushing demand" suggest that Napster
possessed the requisite knowledge of the infringing activity."
The next determination to be made is whether Napster "induce[d],
cause[d], or materially contribute[d]" to the infringing conduct of its
users. The Napster file sharing system is analogous to the swap meet
in Fonovisa except that it takes place in cyberspace and is conducted
on a much larger scale. And, just as in Fonovisa, they provide the "site
and facilities for known infringing activity." '' Indeed, it would have
been impossible for the illegal activity to have "take[n] place in the
massive quantities alleged""2 without the services of Napster.
Therefore, Napster's conduct appears sufficient to satisfy the "material
contribution" element of contributory infringement.
C. Vicarious Liability
The first question in determining vicarious copyright liability is
whether the defendant has the "right and ability" to control the
infiinging activity. Like the swap meet operator in Fonovisa, Napster
has the ability to control and police its users. Before a user may log on
to the Napster network, they must agree to its terms which include the
right to refuse service and terminate accounts at its discretion ifNapster
believes the user is violating copyright law or for any other reason, with
or without cause.'0 3 It is clear that Napster does, through its contractual
agreement with its users, have the ability to police the activity of its
users, thus satisfying the "legal" control standard of Fonovisa.
The second prong of the vicarious liability test requires that the
defendant have a "direct financial interest"'" in the infringing activity.
In Fonovisa, the court stated that the proper test in determining the
directness of the. financial benefit is whether the ability to find
infringing material is a "draw" for customers. There can be no doubt
that the idea of obtaining music, for which customers would otherwise
have to pay, for free, draws users to the site. Furthermore, an early
100. Id. at 903
101. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
102. Id. at 264.
103. See Napster, Copyright Policy, at http://www.napster.com/terms (last
visited July 5, 1999).
104. Gershwin Publ'n Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H.L. Green Co., 316
F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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version of Napster advertised the ease with which users could find
popular music without "wading through page after page of unknown
artists." 5  These "popular" songs are precisely the one's whose
copyrights are owned by the record companies. Thus, if users go to the
site to obtain these songs, they are "drawn" there because of the
availability of infringing material.
Although the "directness" of the benefit is substantial enough to
satisfy the standard, the harder question is whether that benefit was
financial in nature. It is true that an entity need not generate a profit in
order to be deemed to have received a financial benefit from infringing
activity, 0 6 but this line of cases has dealt with establishments which,
although not making a profit, charge money for their services.'017
Napster, on the other hand, charges no fees and has no form of revenue
at all. However, the evidence does show that Napster plans to
"monetize" its business in the future through resources such as targeted
e-mail, advertising, direct marketing ofCD's, user fees, and other profit
generating models.0 8 If these facts are read in conjunction with the
statement by the Hobi court that the enterprise need only be "operated
with the goal of making a profit,"'" the conduct of Napster should be
sufficient to establish a direct financial benefit.
V. DOES NAPSTER QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION UNDER THE DMCA?
As we have seen from the discussion above, Napster's chance of
escaping liability under the traditional theories of copyright
infringement is negligible at best. However, Napster may be able to
avoid liability if it qualifies for one of the safe harbor"0 provisions of
the DMCA. As was previously stated, the only safe harbor provision
which Napster could possibly take advantage of is that for information
location tools."' Before the specifics of the this exemption may be
examined, it must be determined whether Napster meets the threshold
requirements applicable to all of the safe harbors. The first of these
requirements, and the most vague, is that Napster qualify as a "service
provider" under the Act.
105. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,904 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
106. See Major Bob Music v. Stubbs, 851 F. Supp. 475, 480 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
107. Id.; see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hobi, Inc., Nos. 92-228-B, 92-657-B,
1993 WL 404152 (M.D. La. June 24, 1993).
108. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
109. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hobi, Inc., Nos. 92-228-B, 92-657-B, 1993 WL
404152, at 3 (M.D. La. June 24, 1993).
110. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2001).
111. 17U.S.C.A. § 512(d).
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A. Is Napster a "service provider?"
Section 512(k) provides two definitions for "service providers." In
order to ascertain what Congress may have intended to be included in
these definitions, they must be examined in detail. Section 512(k)
provides:
(1)(A) As used in subsection (a), the term "service provider"
means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing
of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the user's
choosing, without modification to the content of the material as
sent or received.
(B) As used in this subsection, other than subsection (a), the
term service provider means a provider of online services or
network access, 'or the operator of facilities therefor, and
includes any entity described in subparagraph (A).
It is important to note that the Act offers different definitions of the
term "service provider" depending on which safe harbor provision is at
issue. The exemption for information location tools falls under the
definition provided in 512(k)(1)(B) which, in addition to the definition
provided, specifically includes entities covered in 512(k)(1)(A). Thus,
Napster need only fit into one of the definitions in order to be covered.
Although courts employ many methods when interpreting new and
ambiguous statutes, the first place they should look (and often the last
place they do look, if at all) is to the words of the statute itself. That is,
using practical, common understanding of the words, what do they
mean? Using this approach, the first consideration is whether Napster
is covered by the main definition applicable to the safe harbor at issue.
Section 512(k)(1)(B) defines service providers as those who provide
"online services or network access.' ' 12 In today's Internet driven
society these terms have fairly definite meanings. Online service
providers are typically thought of as those which enable user's to
connect to the Internet or "browsers." Everyone who has Internet
access uses a "browser" to connect their computer to the network.
Some of the more popular of these services are America Online," 3
Microsoft Internet Explorer," 4 and Prodigy."5 Thus, the entities which
fall under this definition of "service provider" are those providing
Internet access and the ancillary services they offer such as e-mail, chat
112. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(B).
113. See America Online, at http://www.aol.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2001).
114. See Microsoft, at http://www.microsoft.com (last updated Mar. 24,2002).
115. See Prodigy, at http://myhome.prodigy.net (last visited Oct. 24, 2001).
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rooms, and web-page hosting services. 1"6 If this definition is accepted,
then Napster cannot be deemed a "service provider" under the first part
of Section 512(k)(1)(B). Napster does not offer "access" to the
Internet. In fact, it is a necessary requirement that a user already have
access to the Internet to use Napster. Rather, Napster assists users who
already have access to the Internet in locating the information they
desire.
The inquiry must next turn to the definition of "service provider"
set out in Section 512(k)(1)(A) which is also included in the definition
of "service provider" under Section 512(k)(1)(B). In order to qualify
as a "service provider" under Section 512(k)(1)(A) an entity must: (1)
provide connections for digital online communications, (2) between
points specified by the user, (3) the material must be chosen by the
user, and (4) the material must not be altered during the transmission.
Utilizing a practical approach, Napster would be able to meet these
requirements without difficulty. Users of the Napster system choose
the material they wish to download by searching the Napster directory.
After completing the search, the user will find himself with a list of up
to 100 "host" users who are also logged on and whose computers
contain the desired song. The user then chooses which host user he
wants to retrieve the song from, thus satisfying the requirement that the
communication be between "points specified by [the] user. That is,
the user specifies that the song be transmitted from point A (host user's
computer) to point B (his computer). Then the Napster system
provides the connection between the two users and the file is
transferred over the Internet. Also, at no time does Napster alter the
content of the material that has been requested by the user. It seems,
therefore, that Napster should qualify as a "service provider" under
Section 512(k)(1)(A) according to the plain wording of the statute.
Rarely, however, is the answer so clear, and a somewhat plausible
argument can be made to the contrary. After all, Congress did provide
two separate definitions for the term "service provider" to be used
depending on which safe harbor is atissue. So, in analyzing the statute
it is necessary to ask, why?
The definition stated in 512(k)(1)(A) is the definition to be used
with the safe harbor for transitory digital network communications.III
This section states that a service provider will not be liable for
infringement "by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing, or
providing connections for, material through a system or network...
116. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998).
117. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2001).
118. 17U.S.C.A. § 512(a).
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operated by ... the service provider."" 9 Thus, this exemption is
intended to protect service providers from liability when third parties
route infringing material through its system. 12 It could be argued then,
that in providing a separate definition for that specific safe harbor
Congress intended that the definition be read in conjunction with the
nature of the exemption. That is, that Congress intended that the
definition under Section 512(k)(1)(A) be read to only include those
entities which transmit infringing material through their system at the
request of third parties. If this interpretation is accepted, then Napster
cannot qualify as a "service provider" under Section 512(k)(1)(A)
because Napster is not such an entity. The infringing material is
transmitted over the Internet through point to point communication
between Napster users and not through the Napster system. 2 I
Such an interpretation is troubling. If Congress intended that the
definition of "service provider" under Section 512(k)(1)(A) was to be
limited to entities through which infringing material passed, why did
they not use the same language used in the exemption dealing with
such entities? The liability limitation for transitory digital network
communications exempts entities from infringement "by reason of the
provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material
throu h a system or network.., operated by... the service provider
.... However, the definition of "service provider" given for that
exemption makes no mention of material passing through the
provider's network as a qualification for coverage. Why did Congress
not define "service provider" as "the transmission, routing, or providing
of connections for digital online communications, between or among
points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, [through
a system or network operated by the serviceprovider]"? The thought
must have crossed their minds. It is the argument of this paper that
Congress intentionally did not add such a limitation because to do so
would undermine the very purpose of the exemption for information
location tools.
Remember, the safe harbor at issue, Section 512(d), is an
exemption from liability for information location tools. The legislative
history states that this exemption was meant to cover search engines
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. See Markiewicz, supra note 43, at 436. Napster cannot take advantage of
this "safe harbor" because nothing is routed through its system, i.e., the infringing
material is transmitted over the Internet between the specified users and not over
the Napster network.
121. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000).
122. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
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and directories of online material.' The need for this exemption is
undeniable. Without search engines, the practicality of the Internet
would be reduced to nearly zero. Thus, Congress set out to protect
search engines such as Yahoo. 124 However, search engines do not
route material through their networks, they merely direct a user to a
site containing the desired material. This is done by way of a "link"
which the user clicks on and a connection is established between the
host website and the user over the Internet. The Napster system
performs a function identical to that of Yahoo or any other search
engine. If the courts, in an effort to exclude Napster from coverage,
were to accept the interpretation that the definition of "service
provider" under Section 512(k)(1)(A) only covers entities that pass
material through its system they would inadvertently alienate the
exact entities which were the basis for the exemption.
Nor is the problem solved by looking to the definition provided
under Section 512(k)(1)(B). If it is true that search engines are meant
to be covered as "service providers" and even if it could be said that
Yahoo fit within this definition (a stretch, indeed), then whichever
definition is used must include not only the Yahoos but also the
Napsters. That is, because the systems perform the same function
they must either both be included or both be excluded. For a court to
do otherwise would amount to judicial legislation.
The exclusion of both is an undesirable result. A better position
would be to include as "service providers" all entities which meet the
"practical" definition of Section 512(K)(1)(B) stated above and leave
it up to Congress to remedy the problem. Such a decision may be
harmful to certain groups in the short term, but that harm is greatly
outweighed by the potential for harm to the Internet as a whole if a
contrary interpretation is adopted. Simply, if search engines are
afforded no protection from liability they will be the primary target
for our litigious society because they have deep pockets. The amount
these entities would have to spend in legal bills would create an
incentive not to engage in the search engine business, and without
search engines the Internet would be severely crippled. Congress
recognized this and attempted to fix the problem, but as is often the
case, the legislation needs fine tuning. So, the fundamental question
is one of value: do we want the whole to suffer for the benefit of a
few, or vice versa? The answer is obvious. Thus, Napster should be
considered a "service provider" as currently defined by the DMCA.
123. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998).
124. See Yahoo!, at http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2001).
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B. Additional Threshold Requirements
After being deemed a service provider under the Act, Napster must
meet two additional prerequisites applicable to all safe harbors in order
to be considered for an exemption. The first is that the service provider
must adopt and implement a policy of terminating accounts of repeat
infringers and must inform its users of the policy. 125 As a condition of
having an account with Napster, all users must agree to their "copyright
policy."'12 6 This policy requires that users comply with all copyright
laws and warns that "Napster will terminate the accounts of users who
are repeat infringers" and "reserves the right to terminate the account
of any user permanently upon any single infringement."' 27 Napster has
enforced this policy by terminating the service of over 700,000 users
to date upon notification of their infringing activity.128
The second requirement is that the "service provider" must
accommodate and not interfere with "standard technical measures" '29
which are "used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted
works.. -110 Because the MP3 format cannot, by its nature, carry
copyright protection or identification technology and Napster carries
only MP3 files, noncompliance with this requirement is not possible.
Thus, Napster satisfies the additional requirements. The inquiry turns
next to the specific "safe harbor" at issue.
C. Section 512(d): Information Location Tools
Section 512(d) service providers who "link" users to online
locations containing infringing material are exempt from liability if
certain conditions are met. The first of these is that the service provider
must not have "actual knowledge that the material.., is infringing" nor
"aware[ness] of facts.., from which infringing activity is apparent."1 31
Furthermore, upon receiving such knowledge the service provider must
remove or disable access to the infringing material.'32 This is the notice
and takedown component. It is necessary to note that actual knowledge
125. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(A).
126. See Napster, Copyright Policy, at http://www.napster.com/terms (last
visited Oct. 24, 2001).
127. Id.
128. See Defendant/Appellant Napster, Inc.'s Opening Brief, at 56, A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
18688 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2000) [hereinafter Defendant/Appellant Napster, Inc.'s
Opening Brief].
129. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(B).
130. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(2).
131. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(B).
132. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d)(1)(C).
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ofinfiinging activity by a service provider, without more, is not enough
for disqualification from the exemption. The service provider must
have actual knowledge and fail to disable access to the infringing
material upon gaining actual knowledge.
Much discussion concerning the information tools exception has
centered around vagueness of the knowledge component.
133
Specifically, how much knowledge constitutes "knowledge of an
infringing site" which would require the provider to remove or disable
access to the material or else lose eligibility for the exemption? The
Congressional analysis of the knowledge component suggests a "red
flag" test be adopted,13 1 whereby, "if the service provider becomes
aware of a "red flag" from which infringing activity is apparent," he
cannot take advantage of the liability exemption unless he complies
with the notice and takedown requirement. 131 Is a "general" actual
knowledge that somewhere on the site there are links to infringing
material enough to meet this "red flag" standard? If so, Napster would
not qualify for the exemption. Due to Napster's complete lack of
copyright ownership and licenses they are certainly aware that its
directory contains links to some infiinging material.
The answer can be found by looking to Section 512(m)(1) which
states that service providers are under no obligation to monitor their
service or affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity. 36
Since the knowledge component is qualified by the takedown
requirement, a "general" actual knowledge cannot be considered a "red
flag." If it was, then Napster would be required to monitor its site in
order to comply with the takedown requirement, something it is
statutorily not required to do. Therefore, to comply with the
knowledge and take down requirements of Section 512(d), Napster
must only disable access to those particular sites which it actually
knows contain infringing material. Napster has complied with this
requirement. To date it has terminated the accounts of over 700,000
users upon notification that those specific sites contain infringing
material.'37
The final requirement that must be met in order to qualify for the
Section 512(d) exemption is that the service provider must not "receive
a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control
133. See Markiewicz, supra note 43, at 438.
134. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998).
135. Id. The report gives only examples of obvious red flags such as,
"pirate.cor" or "bootleg.com."
136. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(m)(1).
137. See Defendant/Appellant Napster, Inc.'s Opening Brief, supra note 128,
at 56.
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such activity."' 138 This is essentially the vicarious liability prong of the
exemption.
The first determination to be made is that of "financial benefit."
Napster is an entirely free service, contains no advertising and has no
source of revenue whatsoever. 139 Thus, Napster receives no financial
benefit at all, much less a direct financial benefit. However, it is true
that Napster appeared sufficiently appealing enough financially for
BMG to want to settle. Granted, a main reason BMG wanted to join
with Napster was Napster's huge, already established user-base. But,
if Napster's user-base is so large because of the availability of
infringing material, it could be considered as a direct financial benefit
attributable to the infringing activity under the Fonovisa "draw for
customers" standard. " However, the court's adoption of the Fonovisa
standard in interpreting the "financial benefit" element of this safe
harbor would, again, effectively exclude the entities for whom the
exemption was designed. Search engines such as Yahoo make money
by selling advertising space on their sites. The rates charged by Yahoo
for this space are determined by the average number of Yahoo users in
any given period of time, and more users allows Yahoo to charge
higher rates because more people will be exposed to the advertisers
messages. Also, there is no doubt that users can access sites containing
infringing material through Yahoo. Thus, if it could be shown that
Yahoo users prefer Yahoo because it conducts more thorough searches
than other engines and some of these users are searching Yahoo for
infringing sites, then the "draw for customers" standard of Fonovisa
will be met. However, search engines such as Yahoo were the very
impetus for the safe harbor in the first place. Congress must have
intended that the "financial benefit" be more direct than that adopted by
the Fonovisa court.
This intention to require a more direct financial benefit is further
evidenced by the legislative history, in which Congress specifically
noted that financial gains made by a service provider running a lawful
business would not be "directly attributable to the infringing activity"
where the same payments are made by infringing users and
noninfringing users alike.' 4' Furthermore, the report went on to state
that one-time set-up fees and flat, periodic payments would not
constitute "financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
138. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d)(2).
139. It should be noted that the fact that Napster settled with BMG and will be
charging a fee really has no bearing on this aspect of the requirement because this
case only concerns Napster's activities prior to the settlement.
140. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
141. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998).
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activity."'42 This seems to suggest that even ifNapster was a fee-based
system they would still not be considered to have received a direct
financial benefit from the infringing activity which would deny them
the ability to take advantage of the safe harbor. Napster's total lack of
revenue, afortiori, would require the same result. 43
The requirement that the service provider must not "receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity" is
predicated upon the provider's "right and ability to control such
activity."' 44 The question of whether "actual" or "legal" control is
required may present significant problems for courts deciding the issue,
and has been the subject of at least one scholarly debate. 145 An "actual
control" control standard requires that there be "some continuing
connection between the two [parties] in regard to the infiinging
activity,'" whereas "legal" control will be satisfied as long as a party
is "in a position to police the infiinging activity.'
' 47
In order to preserve the integrity of the safe harbor provisions, the
courts should adopt an "actual" control standard when interpreting the
DMCA. 41 Under the DMCA a service provider has no obligation to
affirmatively seek out infringing conduct, 149 yet a "legal" control
standard would remove a service provider from protection because he
has the potential to police the infringing activity. It is quite
unreasonable to statutorily grant service providers a right and then
punish them for exercising that right. Furthermore, in order to qualify
for any exemption, it is required that the service provider implement a
procedure for terminating users upon notice of their infringing
activities. 5 If the mere ability to terminate users establishes enough
"control" to disqualify the service provider from the exemptions, it
would create a Catch 22."1 By complying with a necessary
requirement for protection under the safe harbor, a service provider
would automatically fail an additional necessary requirement. Such a
result would effectively preclude all service providers from taking
advantage of the exemptions.
142. Id.
143. It should be noted that the fact that Napster, in its alliance with BMG, will
become a fee-based system in the summer of 2001 is immaterial to the instant case.
144. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d)(2).
145. See generally Wright, supra note 62, at 1012.
146. Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
147. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1163 (2d Cir. 1971).
148. See Wright, supra note 62, at 1026.
149. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(m)(1)
150. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(A).
151. See Defendant/Appellant Napster, Inc.'s Opening Brief, supra note 128,
at 56.
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In Banf Limited, v. Limited, Inc.,52 the court held that a parent
corporation could not be held liable under an "actual" control standard
merely because of its relationship with its infringing subsidiary. In so
doing, the court stated, that "there must be indicia beyond the mere
legal relationship showing that the [party] is actually involved with the
decisions,processes, or personnel directly responsible for the infringing
activity."'" Thus, under an "actual" control standard it is necessary
that the defendant have previously actually exercised control over the
infringing activity itself.5 4 This should not be construed to mean that
by actually terminating infringing users Napster meets the "actual"
control standard. Such an interpretation would create the same
dilemma discussed above. Rather, it should be understood to mean that
the relationship is such that, realistically, the infringer cannot act
without the consent of the third party. Such is not the case with
Napster and its users. Napster merely operates a service whereby users
can locate specific files on the Internet. Napster cannot and does not
specifically know or participate in the infringing activities of its users,
nor is it obligated to monitor files before they are transferred.
Even ifNapster wanted to require their consent or approval of files
before transfer, it would not be economically feasible. Such a task
would be impossible because the only information Napster has is the
name of the songs. Simply because a file on Napster says it is a certain
song does not actually mean the file contains that song. So, Napster
would first have to determine if the song is copyrighted and then it
would have to listen to every file under the named song in order to
determine if the file actually contains that song. The cost of such an
undertaking would be astronomical. At least one court has held that a
finding of actual control may be outweighed by such prohibitive costs
associated with the actual ability to supervise members.' 5
If the "actual" control standard is adopted by the courts, it is
possible that Napster will be found to not have the amount of control
necessary to be disqualified from the exemption. However, this prong
of the exemption is no doubt Napster's greatest weakness. The fact that
the Napster system reads and categorizes all of the files on the users'
hard drives may persuade a court to find that Napster does in fact have
the "right and ability" to control the activities of its users even under an
"actual" control standard. Nevertheless, such a finding will not
automatically disqualify Napster from protection under the DMCA
because the "right and ability to control" is dependent upon a finding
152. 869F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
153. Id. at 1109.
154. See Wright, supra note 62, at 1015 (discussing Banff, 869 F. Supp. 1103).
155. See Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'n, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 3428 (JFK)
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6395 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1994).
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that Napster received a direct financial benefit from the infringing
activity. 156
VI. THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE LEFT TO CONGRESS
Although not the intention of Congress, from the analysis detailed
above it seems that the DMCA safe harbor for information location
tools, as written, allows Napster and its progeny to avoid liability for
copyright infringement. The complexity of the technology involved
and the high risk of potentially dangerous side effects that might occur
as a result of the interpretation a court would need to adopt to preclude
Napster from taking advantage of the DMCA exception, makes a
Napster victory even more plausible. By declining in its preliminary
injunction opinion to discuss in any detail Napster's probability of
exemption under the DMCA safe harbors, the Ninth Circuit has shown
its concern for problems that might arise if the courts are not careful in
answering the issues involved.
For better or for worse, the courts should leave it to Congress to
remedy the problem so as not to contort the DMCA in such a way that
could cause severe unforseen problems. Of course, exactly how
Congress is supposed to do this without alienating those search engines
and technologies without which the Internet would not function creates
an entirely new set of problems. There is no doubt that, absent the
DMCA safe harbor, Napster would undoubtedly be guilty of copyright
infringement. There is also no doubt that the Internet needs search
engines to function effectively. Thus, we have one system providing
a service that is necessary and another providing a service which our
laws deem illegal. But how do you draft legislation that can fairly and
effectively discriminate between these two systems when they are
functionally identical?
Regulation of the uses ofparticular systems is generally the scheme
we adopt when faced with problems like the one at hand. In fact, it is
precisely how we regulate traditional swap meets and it is what the
DMCA was intended to do. With the traditional swap meet we do
simply what the court inFonovisa did, and in so regulating nothing else
in the world is affected. Some swap meets are legitimate and others are
shut down, but the world goes on because there is no overlap between
the swap meet and the essential elements necessary to the proper
function of the material world.
Unfortunately, this is not true for search engines in cyberworld.
The problem is found in the very nature of search engines. Search
engines simply process a word or phrase provided by the user and list
156. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d)(2) (West Supp. 2001).
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the Internet sites containing this word or phrase. Because a search
engine is nothing more than a protocol, a program, it cannot tell the
difference between infringing and noninfringing sites. Of course, a
program can be designed to refuse to search for specific words, but
such filters have a limited application. Take, for example, a music
pirate site called "music man." Since a program can only recognize
terms and not site content, there is no way to filter out a seemingly
legitimate site such as "music man" without using an overly broad filter
term such as "music." If the program has a filter that prevents it from
searching for all sites with the word "music" in them, it would help
prevent copyright infringement but it would also deny access to
thousands of other legitimate sites. Thus, it is inevitable that all search
engines are going to provide links to infringing sites.
It is also true that search engines are essential to the proper
functioning of the Internet, a fact acknowledged by Congress when it
created the safe harbor for information location tools. The problem,
then, should be obvious. All search engines will have links to
infringing sites. The only way to prevent this is by using overly broad
filters. However, using overly broad filters severely limits the
efficiency of search engines. Because search engines are necessary to
the proper functioning of the Internet, limiting the efficiency of search
engines limits the functional capability of the Internet. It is imperative
that Congress consider such consequences when attempting to plug the
loopholes in the DMCA.
Considering the complexity of the problems detailed above, it
seems that Congress will have to think long and hard in order to find a
solution to this problem. One answer may be to add a provision to the
DMCA which allows the court to use some degree of discretion in
determining whether a search engine falls under the safe harbor for
information location tools. However, allowing judicial discretion in an
area where most judges have little or no knowledge or experience may
be a dangerous course of action. Judges faced with problems, the
technical aspects of which are beyond their grasp, often end up making
poor decisions. Inconsistency among the courts could create a
quagmire of legal problems more severe than the ones with which we
are now faced.
Perhaps a better solution would be for Congress to expressly define
certain terms in the exemption for information location tools in a way
that does not alienate those deemed worthy of coverage. For example,
the exemption applies to "providers ... linking users to an online
location,"' 7 but does not define what constitutes an "online location."
Every machine connected to the Internet must have an address to which
157. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d).
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the information sought can be directed, therefore, every computer on
the Internet is an online location. These addresses, known as Internet
Protocol Numbers, are present on every computer on the Internet.
However, in order to have an actual website, the site operator must
have a registered "domain name," e.g., "www.excite.com." Thus,
Congress could define the term as being limited only to those locations
which have a registered "domain name." This would definitely
eliminate services such as Napster from coverage because individuals
generally only have an Internet Protocol Address and not a registered
domain name. Such a limitation would still allow search engines like
Yahoo to take advantage of the safe harbor because Yahoo only
searches for sites with registered domain names. In fact, all of the
search engines that Congress was intending to protect only search for
sites with domain names, they do not search for individual users.
Such an approach would have the added benefit of making it easier
to locate infingers. When an individual user signs off it is impossible
to trace him, but domain names must be registered and the sites are
always online. Also, it may be possible to regulate the intended use of
the site at the register stage, thereby stopping the infringement before
it starts. Of course there are also disadvantages to not protecting the
point-to-point communication business model createdbyNapster. The
Napster model has tremendous potential and innumerable legitimate
uses. Most importantly, the point-to-point model helps alleviate the
amount of traffic on traditional Internet routing systems which are
becoming overcrowded as more people gain access to the Internet. It
would not be wise to alienate what could be the future of online
communication.
VII. CONCLUSION
Napster should be able to take advantage of the safe harbor for
information location tools as currently written in the DMCA. And,
regardless of what Congress ultimately decides to do to remedy the
problems with the DMCA safe harbors, it is important that the remedy
be fashioned by Congress and not the courts. For the court to find
Napster ineligible for the safe harbor, it will have to interpret the
DMCA in such a way that it will create problems it cannot
comprehend.
Congress definitely has a tough road ahead, but it has the benefit of
inexhaustible resources from which it may, after careful consideration,
fashion a remedy. It is after all the job of Congress, not the courts, to
make the laws, and Congressional oversight of a loophole does not
impute that power to the courts.
Matthew James Fantaci
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